Treason; espionage; disclosure of state secrets
1. High treason. An object
– external security of the Russian Federation.
Objective side:
State secret
– information protected by the state in the field of its military, foreign policy, economic, intelligence, counterintelligence and operational investigative activities, the disclosure of which could harm the security of the Russian Federation.
Espionage
is expressed in the transfer, collection, theft or storage for the purpose of transferring to a foreign state, foreign organization or their representatives information constituting a state secret.
Disclosure of state secrets
– transfer to a foreign state of information possessed by the perpetrator.
Other assistance
– actions that objectively contribute to the hostile activities of foreign states, foreign organizations or their representatives against the Russian Federation.
Finished
from the moment of action, regardless of the consequences.
Subjective side
- direct intent.
subject
– citizen of the Russian Federation (from 16 years old).
2. Espionage. An object
– external security of the Russian Federation.
Objective side:
Transfer of information
– communication of information in any way to a foreign state, foreign organization or their representatives.
Collecting information
– obtaining this information in various ways (through personal observation, photographing secret objects, using sound recordings, purchasing for money, etc.).
Theft of information
– stealing information by seizing documents, objects, audio and photographic materials, computer floppy disks.
Information storage
– ensuring the safety of information that is the subject of espionage.
Finished
from the moment of performing any of the actions.
Subjective side
- direct intent.
Target
– for transfer to a foreign state, foreign organization or their representatives.
Subject
special – foreign citizen or stateless person (from 16 years of age).
3. Disclosure of state secrets. An object
– external and economic security of the Russian Federation.
Subject
– information constituting a state secret.
The objective side
is the disclosure of information constituting a state secret.
Disclosure of state secrets
– communication to an outsider of information constituting a state secret in any way (orally, in writing, by publication) or failure to take measures to ensure the safety of state secrets.
Subject
special - a person to whom state secrets were entrusted or became known through service or work (from the age of 16).
The Prosecutor General's Office of Russia recalled treason in connection with the events in Ukraine - what does this mean?
— That is, if I, having learned that someone has died, inform about it, say, the relatives of the deceased, and this is heard and recorded by a third party, am I a criminal?
- It’s not clear here either. Our legislation on state secrets and the legislation that provides for responsibility for collecting state secrets are extremely vague. It is unclear what the presidential decree classifies in detail. Lists of information subject to classification are themselves secret. Until now, we cannot understand whether such information is information about one person killed or whether the secret consists of some statistical data on the number of deaths in a specific military unit during special operations. It is impossible to answer this question due to the secrecy of our legislation. We tried to challenge this decree in the Supreme Court. We were refused. Neither the representatives of the Prosecutor General's Office nor the representatives of the Russian Presidential Administration in court could answer the question that we are now discussing. — If a foreign journalist or expert calls me, a journalist or an expert, etc. and asks for my opinion, what am I risking?
— We have the case of Ivan Safronov.
Journalist who covered topics related to the Ministry of Defense. This is a very famous thing. Ivan is still in jail (since July 2022 on charges of treason . - Ed.
).
In fact, he is held accountable for his conversations with his colleagues. “I call my brother in Kherson and tell him that his brother from the so-called Pskov is now on the outskirts of Kherson as part of the Russian troops, that he can wave to him through the window.
Is this treason? - Yet again.
Due to the fact that you and I do not know what exactly is a state secret, we cannot say for sure whether this action is treason or not. But, of course, there will be questions about how you learned this information. And further questions that will be important for qualification, what your brother does, to whom he can convey this information. — What is the proof in the above cases?
Correspondence, billing, something else? — In principle, in these cases, any data that confirms the transfer of any information is used as evidence.
SMS messages, correspondence in the messenger, wiretapping of telephone conversations, testimony of witnesses who were nearby, recordings from video cameras in the cafe. All this can be evidence. — Is the warning from the Prosecutor General’s Office itself legal in conditions where de jure a special regime has not been introduced in Russia?
As far as we understand, after February 24, neither a wartime regime nor a national emergency regime was introduced in Russia. — The text of the warning from the Prosecutor General’s Office consists of 90% quotes from the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Quoting our code is, of course, legal. It is important to understand that this norm is valid not only from February 24, 2022. It has been in effect since the end of 2012. This rule applies regardless of whether martial law or some other special regime has been introduced in the country.
Concept and types of espionage
Espionage is understood as the illegal collection of information about a foreign state and its transfer to third interested parties.
Espionage is carried out by a specially trained person - a spy. This activity involves complex undercover work and involves numerous risks.
There are several types of espionage:
- economic (industrial) – collection and transmission of information about the country’s economic plans and indicators;
- political – collecting information about political behind-the-scenes decisions, as well as about the personal lives of any political leaders;
- military - secret intelligence activities in the troops or behind enemy lines during armed conflicts.
Criminal liability for high treason
The article on high treason provides for one of the most severe penalties in Russian criminal law. For this crime, the perpetrators face 12 to 20 years in prison.
The court may also order a fine to be paid in an amount of up to half a million rubles or in the amount of three years’ income.
Another additional measure of liability is restriction of freedom for two years after serving the prison term.
An important aspect of liability for treason is that in order to punish the perpetrator, it is not necessary that his actions cause damage to the state. It is enough that damage could have been caused.
How to avoid punishment?
Russian legislation allows you to avoid punishment for high treason. This is possible under the following conditions:
- The perpetrator voluntarily reported the commission of this crime.
- It helps to minimize damage and minimize the consequences of one’s own illegal actions. The law does not say how to do this, but the process of assisting the investigation will be regulated by the instructions of FSB officers.
It must be taken into account that these conditions allow one to avoid liability for treason only on the condition that it was not accompanied by the commission of other crimes. Otherwise, the culprit will be liable not only under Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. For example, if you kill a person to obtain secret documents, you will have to answer for murder without the possibility of escaping punishment.
Judicial practice in cases of treason often includes facts of the use of the provisions of Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, which make it possible to mitigate the punishment.
Features of military espionage
International humanitarian law establishes the rights of persons carrying out military espionage - spies (Article 29 of the IV Hague Convention on the Laws and Customs of Land War of 1907).
In accordance with Art. 46 of Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention of 1949, they are not combatants (members of the armed forces) and do not acquire the status of prisoners of war, that is, they do not enjoy the protection of international law. According to Art. 30 IV of the Hague Convention, a caught spy cannot be punished without a preliminary trial.
It is necessary to distinguish military spies from intelligence officers. Infiltrators wear the military uniform of the enemy state and work undercover. While employees of foreign intelligence agencies are regular military personnel, their activities are strictly regulated and subject to national legislation (Federal Law of January 10, 1996 “On Foreign Intelligence”).
Differences between espionage and treason
It is necessary to distinguish espionage from high treason, liability for which is provided for in Art. 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Both crimes are directed against the foundations of the constitutional order and the security of the state, and their objective side represents the same actions. High treason itself is defined by the legislator through the concept of “espionage.” The main difference lies in the subject of the crime:
- espionage – foreigners and stateless persons;
- high treason – citizens of the Russian Federation.
Text of the book “Treason and Espionage. Criminal law and criminological research"
Chapter 8 Complicity in high treason and espionage. involvement in these crimes
§ 1. Perpetrator of high treason and espionage.
co-executors Article 32 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation explains:
«Complicity in a crime is the intentional joint participation of two or more persons in the commission of an intentional crime.
».
Intentional joint participation of two or more persons also occurs when committing high treason (Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) in all its forms and espionage, provided for in Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. However, it should be borne in mind that the problem of complicity in the commission of high treason and espionage must be solved taking into account the following features of these crimes.
Firstly, both acts are crimes with special subjects. The subjects of high treason are citizens of the Russian Federation, the subjects of espionage provided for in Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation are foreign citizens and stateless persons. Accordingly, only a Russian citizen can be a perpetrator of high treason, and only a foreign citizen or stateless person can be a perpetrator of a crime under Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
Secondly, the elements of both high treason and espionage (Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation) presuppose the existence of a criminal conspiracy between the subject and representatives of the foreign “addressee”. Sometimes such a conspiracy precedes specific actions by the perpetrator to assist the “addressee” in carrying out hostile activities to the detriment of Russia’s external security. In other cases, a criminal conspiracy is concluded simultaneously with this type of action, for example, at the time of transfer or issuance of state secrets to representatives of the “addressee”. In other situations, the subject commits an act planning to enter into a similar conspiracy in the future. This situation arises when the perpetrator commits espionage of the first type without prior collusion with the “addressee,” when the subject collects, steals or stores information constituting state secrets for the purpose of transfer to a foreign state, foreign organization or their representatives, that is, wanting to establish a criminal conspiracy with these “addressees.” " Therefore, high treason in all its forms and espionage, provided for in Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, are most often committed in complicity. Only the accomplices of the perpetrator in committing these crimes are very peculiar. This is a foreign state, foreign organization or their representatives. This circumstance leaves its mark on the question of the responsibility of accomplices of a person guilty of high treason or espionage, since a foreign state and a foreign organization, according to Russian criminal law, are not subjects of a crime, and therefore cannot bear criminal liability for complicity in high treason or espionage committed by an individual. Responsibility of foreign states and foreign organizations in such situations is possible only within the framework of international law. As for representatives of a foreign state or foreign organization, they, as individuals, in principle, can be punished for complicity in high treason and espionage under Russian laws. However, cases of them being brought to criminal responsibility for such acts are relatively rare, since these representatives either enjoy diplomatic immunity or are located abroad and are inaccessible to Russian law enforcement agencies.
Thirdly, an individual, acting as an accomplice of a traitor or spy (an organizer of his activities, an instigator or an accomplice), most often himself is the perpetrator of actions constituting elements of treason or espionage.
In accordance with part two of Article 33 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, “ a perpetrator is a person who directly committed a crime or directly participated in its commission together with other persons (co-perpetrators), as well as a person who committed a crime through the use of other persons who are not subject to criminal liability due to age, insanity or other circumstances provided for by this Code.”
In cases where a person, being an accomplice of a traitor or spy, himself carries out the objective side of the crimes provided for in Articles 275 or 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, the actions of such a person are qualified depending on the perpetrator of which crimes he was. For example, if a person, at the request of a traitor or spy, transfers information constituting a state secret to a foreign “addressee,” or collects, steals or stores such information for the purpose of transferring it to the “addressee,” he must be held liable for espionage of the first type under Article 275 or 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation depending on his citizenship. Such a person is a co-perpetrator of the crime and is subject to liability in accordance with part two of Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, without reference to Article 33 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
Indirect commission of treason and espionage is quite rare. Various options are possible here, for example, involving the insane or persons under the age of criminal responsibility in treasonous or espionage activities. Cases of this kind occurred during the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, when German intelligence services sent crazy people and minors to the Soviet rear to carry out espionage and sabotage activities. Cases of “false flag” recruitment are likely, when a traitor or spy involves another person in his criminal activities through deception, posing as an employee of Russian intelligence or counterintelligence. The deceived person in such a situation believes that he is acting not to the detriment of the external security of the Russian Federation, but in favor of our country, that is, there is an error in the object. Considering that such a person has no intent to assist foreign “addressees” in carrying out hostile activities to the detriment of Russia’s external security, he is not subject to liability under Articles 275 or 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, since these crimes are committed only intentionally. Under such circumstances, the entity that involved such a person by deception in committing actions that pose a threat to the external security of our country must be held accountable as a perpetrator for the indirect commission of treason or espionage.
Fourthly, it should be borne in mind that the crimes provided for in Articles 275 and 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation are acts involving special subjects.
Part four of Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation establishes:
«A person who is not the subject of a crime specifically specified in the relevant article of the Special Part of this Code, who participated in the commission of a crime provided for by this article, bears criminal liability for this crime as its organizer, instigator or accomplice
».
In our opinion, the norm contained in part four of Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is applicable only in cases where the acts of accomplices, some of whom are Russian citizens, and others are foreign citizens or stateless persons, do not constitute espionage of the first or second type . Since all persons, regardless of citizenship, are responsible for espionage, although provided for by various articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, part four of Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation should be applied only in terms of qualifying their actions under Article 275 or 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, taking into account the subjects of which composition they are. The provisions of this article on the liability of such persons as organizers, instigators or accomplices in such situations, in our opinion, are inapplicable. In cases where espionage is committed by co-principals, some of whom are Russian citizens and others are not, the co-principals are liable under different articles of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. Russian citizens are liable under Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and foreign citizens and stateless persons - under Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, even if they are prosecuted in the same case. Since they are co-executors, reference to Article 33 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is not required.
Judicial and investigative practice shows that this is exactly how the issue is resolved when bringing our citizens and foreigners to criminal liability for joint espionage. Thus, O. Penkovsky was sentenced to death for treason under paragraph “a” of Article 64 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1960 (Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation of 1996). British citizen G. Wynne, who was involved in the same case with him, was found guilty of espionage under Article 65 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR of 1960 (Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation of 1996)[831] 831
See, for example: Trial in the criminal case of British and American intelligence agent, citizen of the USSR O. V. Penkovsky and spy-connector of British citizen G. M. Wynne, May 7–11, 1963. M.: Politizdat, 1963;
Chistyakov N. S.
According to the law and conscience.
M.: Voenizdat, 1976. P. 3–31; Shexter J., Deryabin P.
The spy who saved the world.
Books 1 and 2 / Translation from English. M.: International relations, 1993; Udilov V.N.
Back to the truth.
M.: Jaguar, 1998. P. 133; Prokhorov D. P., Lemekhov O. I.
Defectors. Shot in absentia. M.: “Veche”, JSC “ARIA-AiF”, 2001. pp. 190–202.
[Close]. American E. Pope was charged with espionage under Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. At the same time, Russian citizen A. Babkin, associated with him in espionage activities, was convicted of high treason in the form of espionage under Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation[832] 832
See, for example: Detained on suspicion of espionage // St. Petersburg Vedomosti.
2000. April 6; Who are you, Mr. Pope? // Ibid. April 7; Information about Shkval is considered secret // Ibid. November 16; E. Pope faces 20 years in prison // Ibid. November 30th; V. Putin pardoned E. Pope // Ibid. December 15; Viktorov K.
Hunters for the “Squall”. Loser Edmond Pope was just one of them // Ibid. 2001. January 10; State secret and its protection in the Russian Federation: Educational and methodological manual / Under the general editorship of M. A. Vus and A. V. Fedorov. St. Petersburg: Legal Center Press, 2003. pp. 62–63; and etc.
[Close].
§ 2. Organizer of high treason and espionage.
incitement to these crimes Part three of Article 33 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation establishes:
«An organizer is a person who organized the commission of a crime or supervised its execution, as well as a person who created an organized group or criminal community (criminal organization) or supervised them.”
Thus, responsibility as an organizer of high treason or espionage must be borne by a subject who:
– organized the commission of treason or espionage; or
– directed the commission of treason or espionage; or
– created an organized group or criminal community (criminal organization) to commit treason or espionage; or
– led an organized group or criminal community (criminal organization) created to commit high treason or espionage.
When committing treason or espionage, such functions are most often performed by a resident of a foreign intelligence service or foreign organization. Such a resident is engaged in the recruitment of Russian citizens, foreign citizens or stateless persons to assist foreign “addressees” in carrying out hostile activities to the detriment of the external security of the Russian Federation, gives them criminal tasks and receives from them information of interest to the “addressee”. His receipt of spy information from recruited “sources” constitutes its collection. Therefore, in such cases, the organizer acts as a co-performer, and therefore his actions (depending on his citizenship) must be qualified accordingly under Articles 275 or 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation without reference to Article 33 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. True, the procedural documents (the decision to charge him as an accused, the indictment, the sentence) should reflect his actual role in the commission of the crime, noting that he was not only a co-perpetrator, but also the organizer of the crime. This circumstance must be taken into account when determining the punishment for him.
If the organizer attracts other persons to commit high treason in the form of revealing state secrets or directs their activities in the commission of this crime, then his actions, depending on the circumstances, may be classified differently. In cases where the organizer himself is a representative of a foreign “addressee” and accepts information constituting a state secret from the traitor in order to transfer it to the “addressee,” his actions are covered by the elements of espionage of the first type, since he collects this information. His actions are subject to qualification (depending on his citizenship) under Articles 275 or 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. A reference to Article 33 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in this case is unnecessary, although here too his role as an organizer should be reflected in the procedural documents. If the organizer organizes the commission of high treason by the subject in the form of issuing state secrets or directs its commission, but does not collect, steal, store or transmit this information, he cannot be recognized as a co-perpetrator of high treason. His actions must be qualified under part three of Article 33 and Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, since he acts as an organizer of high treason in the form of issuing state secrets. At the same time, for qualification under these articles, the citizenship of the organizer does not matter, since he is an accomplice precisely to high treason. As already noted, part four of Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation establishes that a person who is not the subject of a crime specifically specified in the relevant article of the Special Part of the Criminal Code, who participated in the commission of a crime under this article, bears criminal liability for this crime as its organizer.
The organizer of high treason in the form of other assistance should, as a rule, bear responsibility under the third part of Article 33 and Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, regardless of his citizenship. An exception to this rule is provided by cases where the organizer of this form of high treason, being a Russian citizen, himself entered into a criminal conspiracy with representatives of the foreign “addressee”. Under these circumstances, such an entity, having entered into a criminal conspiracy, commits high treason in the form of other assistance. Therefore, his organizational activities carried out within the framework of this conspiracy constitute a continuing crime. Therefore, he must be held liable for high treason in the form of other assistance under Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation without reference to Article 33 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. The study of judicial and investigative practice shows that an entity that carries out a criminal conspiracy with representatives of a foreign “addressee” by organizing other persons to assist the “addressees” in carrying out hostile activities to the detriment of the external security of Russia is liable as a perpetrator of high treason in the form of other assistance .
Part four of Article 33 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation establishes:
«An instigator is a person who induces another person to commit a crime by persuasion, bribery, threat or other means.
».
An instigator of high treason in any form is subject to criminal liability under part four of Article 33 and Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. At the same time, according to the provisions of part four of Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, it does not matter whether the instigator himself is a subject of high treason or not. The same applies to a subject who incites another person to commit espionage under Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. An exception to this general rule is the actions of a citizen of the Russian Federation who has entered into a criminal conspiracy with representatives of a foreign “addressee” and is engaged in incitement within the framework of this conspiracy. Such a person should be held liable under Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation as a perpetrator of high treason in the form of other assistance, since inducing other persons to commit treason or espionage constitutes assistance to a foreign “addressee” in carrying out hostile activities against our country. The actions of the perpetrator are subject to qualification under Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, regardless of whether he incited Russian citizens to treason or foreign citizens or stateless persons to espionage.
The application of part five of Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation in relation to the organizers of high treason or espionage and instigators of these crimes has a certain originality.
Part five of Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation reads:
«If the perpetrator does not complete the crime due to circumstances beyond his control, the remaining accomplices bear criminal liability for preparation for a crime or attempted crime. A person who, due to circumstances beyond his control, failed to persuade other persons to commit a crime, is also criminally liable for preparation for a crime.
».
An exception to the rule established by part five of Article 34 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation is the failed complicity in high treason or espionage of Russian citizens who committed actions to organize, direct these crimes or incite them within the framework of a criminal conspiracy with representatives of a foreign “addressee”. Under such circumstances, these persons carry out a criminal conspiracy to assist foreign “addressees” in carrying out hostile activities to the detriment of the external security of the Russian Federation and must bear criminal liability for completed treason in the form of other assistance. For example, Kazachkov, having entered into a criminal conspiracy with a representative of the US CIA and having received from him the task of acquiring a source of information at an important defense enterprise, tried to attract his friend Vanin (last name changed), a research fellow at this enterprise, to collect information of interest to the CIA. Vanin refused Kazachkov’s offer, and therefore his inducement to betrayal failed. In this episode, Kazachkov was found guilty of complete treason in the form of other assistance, since, by inducing Vanin to commit treason, he carried out the assignment of an American intelligence officer and, thus, assisted a foreign state in carrying out hostile activities to the detriment of the external security of our country[833 ] 833
See, for example:
Katukova I.V.
Vigilance is our weapon.
L.: Znanie, 1980. pp. 11–12; Demidov P. P.
Mask: Essay.
Khabarovsk: Book publishing house, 1980; him
.
Mask // Security officers. L.: Lenizdat, 1982. pp. 377–399; him.
Dead to rights. L.: Lenizdat, 1982; and etc.
[Close].
§ 3. Complicity in high treason and espionage
Part five of Article 33 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation establishes:
«An accomplice is a person who assisted in the commission of a crime by advice, instructions, provision of information, means or instruments for committing a crime, or the removal of obstacles, as well as a person who promised in advance to hide the criminal, means or instruments of committing a crime, or objects obtained by criminal means, as well as a person who promised in advance purchase or sell such items
».
Thus, an accomplice to a crime is a person who promotes, assists, or assists in the commission of a crime in various ways, namely:
– advice;
– instructions;
– provision of information;
– provision of means or instruments for committing a crime;
– removing obstacles to committing a crime;
– a promise given in advance to hide the criminal;
– a promise given in advance to conceal the means or instruments of committing a crime;
– a promise given in advance to hide traces of the crime;
– a promise made in advance to hide items obtained by criminal means;
– a promise given in advance to purchase or sell items obtained by criminal means.
An accomplice can facilitate the commission of a crime in any of these ten ways or use various combinations of them.
By facilitating the commission of treason or espionage with advice, the accomplice expresses his opinion on how to more effectively carry out this act, how to conceal it from counterintelligence agencies, how to hide from the scene of the crime, what methods of maintaining contact with the foreign “addressee” to use. In this case, the accomplice acts deliberately, realizing that he is promoting treason or espionage, and wanting to provide assistance in their commission. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that in cases where a Russian citizen assists with advice in the commission of a crime a person who is a representative of a foreign “addressee”, of which the subject is aware, his behavior goes beyond the scope of complicity in high treason or espionage. His actions should be qualified as high treason in the form of other assistance. It does not matter whether the representative of the foreign “addressee” to whom he assists with advice is a foreign citizen, a stateless person or a citizen of the Russian Federation. It is important that an entity who is a citizen of Russia provides assistance in carrying out hostile activities to the detriment of the external security of our country to a person acting as a representative of a foreign state or foreign organization.
Complicity, accomplished by providing instructions, differs from assistance with advice in the form in which proposals are made about methods of committing a crime and other actions related to it. The instruction is imperative in nature; the person who received it requires the person giving the instruction to follow the stated instructions. If this kind of instruction comes from a representative of a foreign “addressee,” then giving the instruction essentially constitutes an assignment to a traitor or spy. In this regard, it is necessary to consider the question of whether the person giving the instruction acts as the organizer of the crime, and also whether his actions constitute espionage in the form of collecting relevant information.
Complicity committed by providing information should be distinguished from the transfer or issuance of information constituting the subject of espionage of the first or second type, as well as the issuance of secrets. If a person transfers (gives out) to a traitor, spy or representative of a foreign “addressee” information that is the subject of these acts, he acts not as an accomplice, but as a perpetrator of high treason or espionage in the appropriate form or type. Therefore, as aiding treason or espionage, it is necessary to consider providing the traitor or spy with other information, namely, information that makes it easier for him to commit a crime, the opportunity to avoid responsibility for what he has done, etc. For example, this could be information about the location of the traitor or spy of interest materials, about the security system, place of residence or route of movement of a representative of the foreign “addressee”, etc. Providing information differs from giving advice or instructions in that the informant simply provides information to the criminal, without expressing his opinion on the advisability or need to act in accordance with them.
Providing means or instruments for committing high treason or espionage consists of providing a traitor or spy with means of collecting and recording information, including for secretly obtaining it, transport, communications, items that provide access to information, weapons, makeup, clothing for dressing, etc.
Removing obstacles to committing treason or espionage may involve distracting guards and other persons who could prevent the traitor or spy from committing a crime, making holes in a fence or wall to make it easier for the criminal to enter the place where information is stored, breaking into a safe to give him the opportunity take possession of the materials stored there, etc. The removal of obstacles is also carried out by a person who facilitates the conclusion of a conspiracy between the subject and foreign “addressees” in situations where the “parties” to this conspiracy have difficulty establishing direct contact with each other.
Speaking about a promise given in advance to hide a criminal, the means or instruments of committing a crime, traces of a crime or objects obtained by criminal means, as well as a promise to acquire or sell such objects, it should be noted that complicity forms precisely such a promise. If a person, being a Russian citizen, fulfills this promise, there is reason to investigate the question of whether his actions constitute treason in the form of other assistance or espionage. The fact is that by making this kind of promise, the subject assists the traitor or spy, strengthening their confidence in the successful, from their point of view, outcome of the criminal act. This is what complicity is all about. If a Russian citizen knows that the subject he is assisting maintains a criminal connection with a foreign “addressee”, that is, has become, in essence, a representative of the “addressee”, then through him he provides assistance to the “addressee” in carrying out hostile activities to the detriment of Russia's external security. Naturally, the assessment of the activities of such a person must be appropriate. Moreover, the storage of objects obtained by criminal means, if these are materials collected or stolen by the subject containing state secrets, constitutes espionage of the first type. Therefore, providing this kind of assistance to a traitor or spy is not complicity, but an act of espionage, for the commission of which Russian citizens should be held liable under Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, and foreign citizens and stateless persons - under Article 276 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
